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The central thesis in Intuitions as Evidence is that philosophical intuitions are rational or a priori
intuitions that constitute defeasible evidence that some proposition is (necessarily) true. Pust’s preferred
analysis of a priori (or rational) intuitions is a modified version of an analysis offered by George Bealer.
A1
S has a rational intuition that p if and only if (a) S has a purely intellectual experience when
considering the question of whether p, that p, and (b) at t, if S were to consider whether p were
necessarily true, then S would have a purely intellectual experience that necessarily p.
The emphasis on a priori or rational intuitions is made to contrast them with what Bealer calls “physical
intuitions”. Physical intuitions are similar to rational intuitions in being intuitions that a proposition p is
true. But as a class physical intuitions are distinctive in failing to be intuitions that a proposition is
necessarily true. So, for instance, (Bealer’s example) we might have an intuition that a house will fall
when undermined, but that proposition does not present itself to us as necessary. The purely intellectual
experiences referred to (A1) are intellectual seemings that are familiar enough to anyone who has had
some experience with the Analysis-Counterexample approach to philosophical discussion. The set of
conditions offered in the countless analyses of knowledge, for instance, (intellectually) seem to be both
necessary and sufficient for S’s knowing that p. But provided with the inevitable counterexample we find
that all or some of the conditions seem either insufficient or unnecessary for knowledge—or of course
both. It is perfectly possible that (A1) is the correct analysis of philosophical intuitions and that
philosophical intuitions have no evidential value at all. The claim that they do have evidential value is
defended in the succeeding chapters.
The first chapter is primarily descriptive and shows that much of contemporary philosophy appeals to
intuitions as evidence for/against various positions. And it is no doubt correct that standard attempts at
philosophical analyses—the analysis of knowledge, rationality, justification, moral rightness, etc.—appeal
to particular case intuitions. These particular cases are designed to provide exceptions to various general
analyses. And though this approach remains pervasive there is also considerable skepticism over its
usefulness. Some of this Pust notes. There is for instance almost no one who believes that the long
history of “S knows P epistemology” was an especially fruitful endeavor. And of course there is the
endless debate between the Two-boxers and the One-boxers on the Newcomb Problem, between the
causal theorists and evidential theorists on rational choice, between plastic and non-plastic theories of
rationality, between compatiblists, incompatiblists, and semi-compatiblists on free will, between
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consequentialists and deontologists on everything in moral theory, and so on and on. But then should the
thesis that philosophical intuitions are evidential lead us to expect—especially given the terrific energy
expended on some rather narrow questions—greater convergence on the answers to these questions?
Perhaps that is expecting too much. Still it would be nice to have some explanation why this approach
has ushered in so little progress.
There are in chapter (1) useful distinctions made among particularist, generalist, and global intuitions. As
might be expected particularists maintain that only those intuitions concerning particular cases have
epistemic value. Generalists maintain that only those broader theoretical intuitions are evidential. And
globalists are prepared to accept both sorts (and presumably intuitions at every level of generality) as
evidential. It is not especially clear—at least not to me—how one would defend either of the extreme
positions on intuitions and it is good that Pust seems to find the global position congenial. (p. 12).
Of course, intuitions can be radically misleading. Here it is useful to compare the common intuitions
about probability distributions that lead directly to Bertrand’s paradox and the typical intuitions in
confirmation theory that are so often mistaken. To offer just one example, if evidence E disconfirms A
and also disconfirms B most are prepared to conclude—and it certainly seems intuitive—that E
disconfirms their conjunction. But of course that’s badly mistaken. E might even confirm their
conjunction. Pust advances the position that intuitions are not infallible and that they constitute at most
prima facie evidence. But that seriously understates the matter. It is a crucial feature of our intuitions that
they are sometimes radically misleading and constitute no evidence at all. It would have been good to
have more discussion of the tentative nature of this evidence, of the important distinction between tutored
and untutored intuitions, and especially the sense in which philosophical intuitions constitute prima facie
evidence.
There is a discussion of an alternative philosophical method: the method of reflective equilibrium (cf. p.
13 ff.). It is Pust’s conclusion that this method is really no alternative at all. The various versions of
reflective equilibrium are all treated as versions of particularist or global intuitionism on which
justification comes to a stop with intuitions. The discussion is interesting, but it surprisingly ignores the
later views John Rawls expressed in Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
Rawls notes,
Thus it is only by affirming a constructivist conception—one which is political and not
metaphysical—that citizens generally can expect to find principles that all can accept (p. 97
ff).
The method of reflective equilibrium does not on Rawls’ view come to a stop with intuitions that evince
the correct metaphysical principles of justice. The principles of justice have rather a free-floating political
basis. And Rawls is not alone in viewing the basic principles of justice as something less than the
metaphysical truth about justice. David Gauthier assumes in ‘The Social Contract as Ideology’ that
principles of justice express a particular contractual ideology about justice (cf. Moral Dealing, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1990). So it is difficult to see the method of reflective equilibrium—certainly
as Rawls understood the method—as being one on which particular or general intuitions function to
provide evidence for or against competing principles of justice. It seems closer to the truth to say that
intuitions in this context serve to guide the articulation of our received Western European sense of
justice. This is not to deny of course that the method of reflective equilibrium might be used in other
ways. It might. But not much is said about the possibility that the method of reflective equilibrium does
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not in general yield metaphysical conclusions.
Chapter (2) develops the view discussed above concerning the nature of philosophical intuitions and
culminates in principle (A1). Chapters (3) and (4) provide respectively empiricist (explanationist)
skepticism about the evidential nature of intuitions and the problems with that skepticism. These are
particularly interesting chapters. The questions here concern whether intuitions should be the primary
source of evidence in philosophical inquiry and whether intuitions have any evidential worth at all.
Among those taking the skeptical position we find arguments from Gilbert Harmon (moral skepticism),
Stephen Stich (semantic skepticism) and Alvin Goldman (metaphysical skepticism). But there is a
general structure, argues Pust, that each of these skeptical arguments share. The general form of the
skeptical arguments is the following.
General Skeptical Argument
1. Other than propositions about an observation or an intuition, S is justified in accepting a
proposition p only if the truth of p plays a necessary role in the best explanation of the occurrence
of one or more of S’s observations or intuitions.
2. Propositions of type X do not play any role in the best complete explanations of S’s “observings”
or “intuitings.”
3. Therefore S is not justified in accepting propositions of type X.
The general skeptical argument contends that the best explanation for our intuitions—e.g., the moral
intuition that we should not inflict gratuitous harm or the metaphysical intuition that free will is
incompatible with causal determinism—does not include the truth of (the contents of) those intuitions.
Since the truth of that moral proposition and that metaphysical proposition does not play a role in
explaining why we have that moral intuition and that metaphysical intuition it follows that we are not
justified in accepting those propositions as true.
It should be emphasized that this conclusion is compatible with the view that many of our intuitions do
have evidential value. It depends entirely on the results of what will have to be some lengthy empirical
investigations. We have countless intuitions. Perhaps we will discover after all that the truth of many of
our moral intuitions do play a necessary role in explaining why we have those intuitions. For instance, if
moral properties supervene on natural properties—as almost every moral theorist believes— then a causal
explanation of our moral intuitions is certainly not out of the question. If that is so then a moral intuition
that p is true does confirm that p is true.
Pust contends that the general skeptical argument is unsound. Specifically Pust contends that we are not
justified in believing premise (1) of the General Skeptical Argument. But it is difficult to see how our
philosophical intuitions—say, again, our moral intuitions—might be evidential unless something like
premise (1) is true. Suppose the truth of the content of our intuitions plays no necessary role in
explaining why we have those intuitions. Suppose for instance that the fact that promise-keeping is a
good institution does not play a causal role in explaining why anyone has the intuition that promise-
keeping is a good institution. That leaves open the possibility (for instance) that a deficiency in vitamin
B12 causes (through some strange etiology) the belief that promise-keeping is a good institution. Of
course the fact that the belief has the given etiology does not entail that the belief is false. Similarly the
belief that there is a komodo dragon in your living room might be caused by an hallucinogenic drug, but
that does not entail that your belief is false. But if as chance would have it those beliefs are true it is
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difficult to see how they are justified. In general, rejecting premise (1) in the General Skeptical Argument
leaves open the possibility that our intuitions have fully unreliable causal histories.
The argument against premise (1) asserts that there are two (and only two) ways to argue for (1). Either
(1) is simply intuitive or (1) is inductively supported by our intuitions regarding particular cases of
justified belief (p. 85). Pust finds no justification for (1) on either score. But what about the possibility
that the truth of (1) plays a necessary role in explaining why we have the intuition—or at least some of us
have the intuition—that (1) is true? It is perfectly possible that the truth of some intuitions plays a
necessary role in explaining those intuitions while the truth of other intuitions do not. The justification of
a theory of justification must (presumably) involve some bootstrapping. Should a theory of justification
be justified by its own lights or by the lights of some other theory of justification? Pust does not (or does
not directly) consider this possibility in his discussion of the justification of (1). But it seems to be
exactly the sort of justification—if there is one—that one should expect for premise (1).
In the chapter (5) Pust argues for the reliability of philosophical intuition as a truth-producing method of
acquiring beliefs. Pust argues that if sense perception is a reliable source of belief-formation then so is
intuition. Just as the deliverances of sense perception cannot offer a basis for the reliability of sense
perception, so the deliverances of philosophical intuition cannot offer a basis for the reliability of
intuition. The argument Pust advances depends (in part) on the assumption that “we have no good (i.e.
non-epistemically circular) reasons for thinking intuitions are reliable”(104). We can do no more than
rely on intuition to “justify” our intuitions. But of course there needn’t be any epistemic circularity here.
Distinctions among intuitions need not be invidious. For instance we have all sorts of intuitions in
mathematics, confirmation theory, and logic. Why isn’t it an independent test of intuition that it seems
wildly counterintuitive that two infinite sets can differ in size or cardinality? We can test the intuition
against a reliable mechanical proof procedure. Why isn’t it an independent test of intuitions that it seems
wildly unintuitive that if A entails B then E might confirm A and disconfirm B despite the fact that it
must be true that Pr(A/E) < Pr(B/E)? Again we have what appears to be an independent and non-circular
test of our intuitions against a reliable mechanical proof procedure. Now perhaps these proof procedures
are themselves justified by certain philosophical intuitions. In that case we might find that most of our
interesting intuitions in confirmation theory, mathematics and logic are fully unreliable. And we might
find some basis for the position that interesting intuitions in most areas are unreliable.
But could the faculty of intuition be reliable after all? The faculty of intuition is reliable only if it is
possible both that the causal explanation of our intuitions is completely unreliable—compare the B12
example above— and our intuitions are nonetheless evidential. And obviously it is difficult to see how
an intuition could have an unreliable cause and remain evidential. There is no discussion of this point,
but it would be good to see whether this is indeed possible.
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